Thursday, April 23, 2009

PAKISTAN AT THE PRECIPICE

By: Dr Akmal Hussain

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The speech by Sufi Muhammad, leader of the Tehreek-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi, before a huge crowd in Mingora (Swat) last Saturday, represents a critical moment in the crisis of the Pakistani state. It clearly laid out the ideological framework within which the Taliban seek to achieve power and establish governance in Pakistan.

The Sufi specified the following six important postulates, which made clear the strategic objective of overthrowing the existing constitutional order of Pakistan:

1. He asserted that sharia (as interpreted by the Taliban) is seen as divine law.
2. He defined a Muslim not just in terms of someone who believes in the Oneness of God and the fact that Muhammad (PBUH) was the last prophet of God, but as one who supports and helps to implement the sharia.
3. He stipulated that the existing democratic order was an “un-Islamic system of the infidels” and that supporting such a system was a great sin.
4. The persistence of the “un-Islamic system of the infidels”, in his view, would destroy Pakistan and that he and his supporters would defend the country in the sense of attempting to establish their version of the sharia.
5. The superior courts of Pakistan were seen as part of the un-Islamic system of infidels and therefore rejected as institutions where legal appeals against qazi courts were to be made. Instead, he claimed that such appeals would be made before the soon to be formed institution of Darul Qaza.
6. The Nizam-e Adl (the system of justice established in Swat) as an application of the Taliban version of sharia under the “peace deal” was seen by the Sufi as only the first stage of the implementation process of sharia. According to him, sharia would be completed when it encompassed the institutional structures of Pakistan’s polity, economy and education.

These six postulates taken together constitute an ideological clarion call to all Muslims to join in the struggle of the Taliban to overthrow the existing democratic constitutional order in Pakistan for the establishment of their version of an Islamic state.

In this sense, Swat, like the other areas in the NWFP occupied and governed by various Taliban groups, is a base area from which the ideological, political and military struggle to establish a Taliban state in Pakistan is to be conducted.

Of course, the government regards the compromise in Swat as a “peace deal”, even though the TNSM has clearly stated that they will only provide peace if their version of sharia is implemented. The question is: Will they stop at Swat or pursue their broad strategic goals in the rest of Pakistan once Swat is secured?

Clearly there is a high quality military mind behind the Taliban strategy. In the first phase, large swathes of FATA were captured and a system of governance established by the Taliban at the level of a system of justice, the provision of livelihood for the poor, and a system of recruitment and military training. In the second stage, they enlarged their territorial control over some of the settled areas of the NWFP.

At the same time, guerrilla raids were conducted on key targets in the major cities of the country. The purpose was to undermine the confidence of the citizens in the ability of the state to fulfil the most basic function in terms of which it seeks legitimacy: protection of life of its citizens.

In the third stage, there is a shift from the valleys to the urban centres where strongholds have now been established. These strongholds of urban guerrillas are located in major cities such as Peshawar in the north, Lahore in the east, Multan and Karachi in the south and Quetta in the west. Pakistan is encircled by urban guerrilla forces poised to unleash mayhem of an intensity and scale unprecedented in Pakistan. If and when this happens, it could be a prelude to takeover.

The events in Swat fit a pattern of strategy that is slowly being unveiled. Only time will tell whether the Swat deal will give “peace in our time” as Chamberlain put it or will constitute what Churchill called the “end of the beginning”.

For many Pakistanis who are now leaving the country, this is the beginning of the end. It is time for the government, the military and the people of Pakistan to grasp the significance of the historic speech by Sufi Muhammad.

 

 

Thursday, October 23, 2008

REVISITING OUR US ALLIANCE

BY: SOBIA ADIL

Pakistan today experiences an increased level of conflict and a perception is being built to undermine its military capability.

In this context, America's approach needs to be seen in the context of its long-term strategic interests in the region, which forces it to engage with Pakistan. However, to achieve this it pursues a policy of controlled chaos enabling it to keep the option of political and military intervention alive.

In the case of Pakistan this shifting of conflict and creation of chaos serves the interests of most of the regional stakeholders and power-brokers operating inside Afghanistan. The coalition finds benefit in reduction of military operations on its side. Afghanistan finds it beneficial because the world's attention is diverted towards Pakistan. India is obviously happy, and so is Russia, while Iran is content since because its potential economic competitor – Pakistan – is handicapped by persistent security concerns.

In this regard the worrisome aspect is that while the US can pinpoint even a needle on the ground from space, it never finds sufficient evidence of miscreants hostile to Pakistan. One never reads about any Predator strike in terrorist sanctuaries in Swat and Bajaur. Neither has one heard of any blocking position by coalition and Afghan forces opposite Bajaur, where the militants flee and find sanctuary. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the conflict in FATA and elsewhere in the NWFP is being aided and abetted by Washington.

Another contributing factor is the increased presence of US Special Forces in the region and the presence of mercenaries in the garb of contractors and representatives of NGOs operating on both sides of the border. These elements provide security to individuals/organisations. They are reported to be extensively employed in conjunction with SOCOM (Special Operations Command) and the CIA. These former soldiers are mercenaries not constrained by any rules of engagement. Around 30,000 work in Afghanistan and many operate near and around FATA.

Yet another contributor worth evaluating is the arrangement of sustaining coalition forces in Afghanistan. On average, around 2,000 trucks travel every month through Pakistan and this operation is managed by the US Embassy through private contractors. The contents of these trailers are not known to Pakistan. The arrangement is a security hazard, to say the least.

The solution to extremism is not a military one and instead requires a long-term approach which can change hearts and minds. Of course, this requires patience and resources – America doesn't have the former while Pakistan does not have the latter.

Those who advocate more vigorous military action in FATA should understand that this will only complicate matters. The Karzai government and the coalition have of late sought to engage with the Taliban in Afghanistan and we must try and do the same on our side of the border. To win peace we should undertake selected operations against hostile foreign elements, and that too only if the coalition gives us matching support from the other side of the border.

By no means is one advocating any disengagement with America, for it is a relationship that is significant and must be pursued. However, what is needed is critical evaluation of the relationship and the drawing of a red line, so to speak, which Pakistan should refuse to cross since it will be at the expense of its own national and security interests. Furthermore, the engagement should not be limited to one with a primarily military nature and should be extended to cooperation with civil society, Pakistani think tanks, political institutions, the media and in the form of increased people-to-people contact.