PAKISTAN Special

Yet another brilliant article by Dr Mazari, highlighting how a compromise of Pakistan's sovereignity is being very brazenly facilitated by incompetent Pakistan governmet. How the new prime minister and his cabinet views these advancements and what is their aproach towards checking this dangerous trend is yet to be seen. Indicators are not very encouraging, though. It is obvious that these dwarfs are only busy killing their time in tackling the matters of a lesser importance and are incapable of objectively assessing the present threat to Pakistan's very existence.

BY: SHIREEN M MAZARI
While the nation continues to watch the "back and forth" drama over the restoration of the judges issue, increasingly aware of where it will all end; and while the poor look beyond the judicial issue to the basics of survival in the face of rising costs of staple food and utilities; scant attention is being paid to the rapid threats to the country's sovereignty that are emerging from different quarters that are linked together in an overarching strategic partnership – that is India and the US with the UK an avid supporter. If one only examines events that took place April 23 to April 29 and connects them up, it becomes clear that either by default or by design Pakistan is in danger of losing its sovereignty.

To begin with, take the incident of April 23 when NATO forces (actually US forces) along with some Afghan soldiers attacked FC posts in Bajaur Agency. What is intriguing is the way in which this direct assault on the country's sovereignty was explained away. First we were told that it was a misunderstanding. Then some of us were told that in fact this action was in response to firing from across our side of the international Pakistan-Afghan border.

However, on exploring further it transpires that the firing from our side took place a day earlier so the violence from the US troops was not an immediate response to the firing -- although it is difficult in any case to actually assess the exact spot of the initial firing given the nature of the border. Instead, this was a pre-planned operation, conducted a day later, targeting our FC posts at a time when there were a few FC personnel on duty, and involved 600 US troops along with Afghan soldiers as well as helicopter gunships and tanks! Also, the attack continued for a fair length of time so that the FC was able to call in reinforcements -- again not simply an immediate response to fire from militants! Instead, it seems the US military deliberately targeted our paramilitary forces – to teach them some sort of "lesson".

Interestingly, this attack came a few days after reports that US commanders were seeking to widen their attacks inside Pakistan . Worse still, some of our border posts were occupied by the US-Afghan combine -- but we kept quiet and there was no contemplated retaliation. Why?

Now we hear that the peace talks with our tribal people are breaking down. Clearly a mischievous hand can be discerned, especially when one sees the bizarre story of a handbill being circulated in Peshawar inviting people to join the Taliban. The Taliban have denied the authenticity and, on this count, they are probably right because the language being used -- for instance the words "Janat ka direct ticket" -- is more in line with western advertising ruses than Taliban language! Also, the mobile number given in English makes little sense as does the fact that the handbill is in Urdu rather than in Pushto. It would appear the timing is directly an effort to sabotage the ANP's political strategy of dealing with the tribal issue and it does not take too much intelligence to understand who is indulging in such dirty tricks.

To add to efforts at our demoralisation, last week also saw the French Prime Minister declare that Pakistan will "fall" if France leaves Afghanistan ! Honestly, is this what we are being reduced to? Nor is this all. British Foreign Secretary, Milliband, who seems to find no other place to give him the sort of feel-good sense that Islamabad does, has decided to explain to the world on our behalf that "Pakistanis voted for democracy nor Talibanisation"! So are we supposed to feel more confident about ourselves after this statement?

But the British must be feeling pleased with us these days because in another clipping of our sovereignty we have now allowed the British to deploy an airline liaison officer at Islamabad airport -- in other words, the state of Pakistan has delegated its powers to Britain to block the departure of passengers from Islamabad to the UK! Is this a reciprocal renunciation of a chip of our independence? Are we going to be allowed to have similar privileges at British airports to block the travel to Pakistan of undesirables from Britain -- especially "sleeper" terrorists? Of course not! This also happened in the seven-day time period being discussed here, which seems to have been particularly good for those seeking to undermine our sovereignty as a nation.

For it was also in this period that we had former Indian National Security Adviser, Mishra, suggesting that India become part of the US-EU or NATO combine to fight terrorism in Pakistan ! This is like Pakistan suggesting we help India fight terrorism in its northeastern provinces or Hindu extremism in Gujarat ! But we do know that the US is seeking to bring India militarily into Afghanistan and one really wonders when we will react strongly to these efforts -- when it is already too late? Incidentally, the US continues to adopt its arrogantly imperial approach towards Pakistan and now we hear that despite paying the market price for the F-16s, we are not going to get the cutting edge technology India will get with its F-16s. Clearly the F-16 saga will not alter, but let us hope we are not reduced to wheat and soya beans again!

Of course, we are still going the extra mile, unilaterally, to support India on all fronts. We have now agreed in principle that India can export wheat to Afghanistan through Wagah – opening up the long sought after land route by India . Hopefully, this decision will include certain safeguards like ensuring that the transportation from Wagah to the Afghan border is done by Pakistani transporters and that India pays a transport levy. Since the decision has been taken on principle, one must wait to see how it is operationalised, but to allow India physical access through Pakistan 's sensitive areas surely cannot be contemplated. Will India allow us to transport foodstuff to Nepal through the land route from across India ?

At least some political leaders are showing a commitment to reciprocity with Mr Nawaz Sharif demanding a linkage between the Sarabjit case and the case of Pakistani prisoners languishing in Indian jails. No one seems to have shown any sensitivity to this issue at all. Even more critical, commutation of Sarabjit's death sentence to life imprisonment should first be linked to an overall decision by the state to commute all death sentences and, in fact, move to end the death penalty which does not deter most murders and only penalises the poor -- many of whom are wrongly condemned for lack of a good defence. After all, if an Indian who killed innocent Pakistanis is to live why not the poor Pakistanis rotting on death row? Is a foreign life worth more than a Pakistani life for us?

Imagine if so much of our sovereignty was chipped away in a mere seven days, how much of it has already been lost after our embrace of the US-led "global war on terror" post-9/11! Has it all been willingly done?

This paper was written by Mahnoor Khan, a Karachi based educationist sometime back. Now that a lot has rapidly changed in the political arena in Pakistan, it's contents still remain a lot relevant for how the elected assembly tackle with the issues highlighted therein remains to be seen..

 BY: MAHNOOR KHAN

Context:  It has been frequently asserted in national and international media that the imposition of emergency by General Musharraf has been unanimously opposed in Pakistan . While there have been unprecedented protests from diverse groups, the outrage is by no means as widespread as one would expect. Here are just some of the arguments that protestors hear from their friends and colleagues:

1)      Why are you supporting corrupt judges? All the lawyers are politicized and doing this for their own publicity and power.

2)      What are you trying to achieve? Do you want corrupt politicians like Benazir or Nawaz Sharif?

3)      The media was overstepping its boundaries, and the judiciary also became too interventionist. So both were asking for a clampdown.

4)      Musharraf has been a great leader. Yes, he is making mistakes, but he is still our best and only option.

5)      Protests will just cause more instability.

6)      Things will return to normal, so we should just wait and pray for the best.

These are overt and subtle ways in which the emergency is effectively legitimized by the Pakistani elite. In the following piece, I have attempted to articulate my own stance on the issue, and address some of these arguments.

The “Missing People” Case and Judicial Courage:  In February of this year, my ride home from work one evening was interrupted by a sizeable demonstration on Shahra-e-Faisal. The protest – as a radio channel informed me – was against the unlawful abduction and detention of “missing people” by our notorious agencies, and was being staged by hundreds of family members and activists who had traveled to Karachi from distant areas of Sindh. As I waited in my car for the demonstration to pass, I wondered: why is the tragedy of forced disappearances not sparking the outrage that it should? Why wasn’t this protest widely publicized, and supported by the so-called civil society? And what was I doing about this? But of course this line of questioning never continues for long. I brushed off my guilt by resorting tothe classic “what can I possibly do” and “there is no hope” cynicism, unconsciously told myself that I am working for important (and more convenient) causes like education and health so I do have some sense of social responsibility, put on some music, and eventually drove off.

I kept following the issue though. I had already been reading about disappearances regularly in Dawn and Herald since 2003. Even Amnesty International, The New York Times, and the Guardian had established how more than 500 Pakistanis had simply been abducted by our intelligence outfits with no case and no trace. That under the garb of the “war on terror”, there was a systematic campaign to capture critics – not militants – but politics activists, students, poets, journalists, social workers, and academics belonging in particular to Sindh and Baluchistan. That instead of recognizing and addressing the exacerbated grievances of people under a neoliberal military-intelligence alliance, the state had decided to crush any expression of grievance with sheer inhuman violence. Some released detainees had harrowing tales of torture to tell. Even those who protested for the sake of their missing ones were humiliated and intimidated – recall the picture of the 17-year old son of a detainee whose shalwar was lowered by the police during a public protest in January this year, before being arrested.

One becomes conditioned to overlook the entire picture when reading about such atrocities on an everyday basis. And so I read about all this with a sense of real but remote “oh, it’s just so sad” concern. Over the course of this year, however, I became more interested in the issue of missing people. This, unfortunately, was not due to any change in my own conscience, but because the issue itself had become more visible – thanks to the legal petitions that the tormented families as well as the HRCP had filed. And the judiciary was responding.

Our state institutions have become so inept, exploitative, and unjust that when an institution finally does its job, we think it has become too “independent” and “active.” We conveniently forget that defending the constitution and fundamental rights is the core purpose of the judiciary around the world. And we fail to even acknowledge – let alone celebrate – the courage with which the expelled judges were withstanding the coercive pressures and bribes from various corners, in order to question long-standing injustices such as political persecution, shady privatizations, and illegal building practices. Which state institution has had the courage to tackle these issues? Most importantly, the judiciary was questioning the unconstitutional and outrageously criminal activities of our intelligence agencies, of which the plight of missing people is but one manifestation.

I will say it clearly: the renewed democratic spirit of the judiciary had been a source of relief for me. I, as a human being and as a citizen, did not have the time, interest, and decency to actually stand up for the sake of social and economic justice. But it was heartening to see that at least one state institution was working towards progressive change in this country. As the law of indifference goes, though, I only observed this process from a distance. And again, from a distance, I witnessed the lawyers’ struggle to contest the high-handed manner in which the Chief Justice was removed. I, surely, did not have the time or the courage. Plus, with all the pomp of the Chief Justice’s rallies, it was convenient not to take a stance. Indeed, why ever take a stance? It is so much easier to sit back, criticize, and be cynical. And to ease your conscience, tell yourself that your business is helping the poor, or that you do not-so-political charity work.

But now, with the emergency – with the wholesale slaughter of the judicial process and the violent suppression of civil society – I think it is simply imperative for me to take a stance. An informed stance. Yes, of course, like all state institutions, the legal institutions are also ridden with misconduct and corruption. At many critical junctures, the judiciary itself has contributed to the undermining of the Constitution.  But in recent years, it is only the judiciary that has had the courage to show that it has at least some sense of social and political responsibility. If it was so corrupt and power-hungry, why would it take up cases that challenge the elite and military-dominated status quo in the country? Following its own history, it would succumb to bribes and threats, and play along. But it didn’t. And the missing people’s case is the prime testimony to this courage.

The missing people’s case also underlines something that is often ignored in analyses of the emergency: the suppression of activists, journalists, students, and academics is not something new and sudden. Yes, the scale is large, and for the first time, elite human rights activists and professors have also been arrested. But we must not forget that this has been a long-term trend, and that a systematic campaign to capture critics has been an appalling state policy for at least four years now. Newsline, Herald, HRCP, national newspapers as well as international media have repeatedly covered the brutalities of this policy. While media channels may have exploded in Pakistan, let’s not forget that the South Asian Free Media Association named Pakistan the worst country in terms of the harassment of journalists in 2006. Hence, the current suppression of the media is also a stark manifestation of a continuing tendency.

Military Extremism and Musharraf’s Islamization:  Why are we so keen to assert that the media and judiciary have overstepped their bounds, but not recognize the extremism and interventionism of the military and the intelligence agencies? I will readily acknowledge that the media and judiciary have severe failings that need to be addressed. But how can we ignore that there is a fundamental asymmetry of power between a military-intelligence establishment on one hand and the media or the judiciary on the other? The Supreme Court and media can be massively irresponsible and corrupt, but they will never have the capacity to amass wealth and power, and terrorize citizens like the military-intelligence alliance that currently rules the country. Who will hold the latter accountable?

The military has become the biggest corporate entity and interest group in the country, and inserted itself in literally every economic, social and political institution including textbook boards, universities and highway authorities. All this has not been achieved “cleanly,” but involved massive corruption, intimidation, and back-door deals. It is different from regular “fill up the bank account” looting since it involves the setting up and expansion of a huge empire that grabs land, monopolizes markets, and dominates political and social institutions. This extent of political and economic dominance will live on regardless of the fate of today’s dictatorship. Amongst other devastating consequences, it has also severely affected the professionalism of the army – as argued by several analysts and retired military officers.

Repeated military rule in our country has not only stifled the process of democratization but also helped to promote religious extremism. Yes, Musharraf is no Zia, and as a person, may indeed be a secular guy believing in “enlightened moderation”. But this is no justification for overlooking the critical role that both the military and intelligence agencies have played in creating and supporting Islamist militancy. Have we forgotten that it was in Musharraf’s regime that a religious alliance was brought into power for the first time in Pakistan ’s history – and allowed to form a government in NWFP – while allsecular-nationalist parties had been suppressed and even banned from rallying? And this was not a coincidence. The military-mullah alliance is not a myth – it is a long-standing relationship that became particularly strengthened in the Afghan War (1978-1989) when the ISI, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. government directly trained and equipped thousands of Pakistanis (not just Afghanis) to become militant jihadis. The Pajero-driven, gun toting mullah emerged during this period, and has continued to be patronized by agencies to fight our dirty wars in Afghanistan, Kashmir, as well as within Pakistan .

Since 2002, the formal establishment of a religious alliance in NWFP has paved the way for legitimizing a conservative and repressive Islam. NWFP may not have had a very liberal society, but the intimidation of barbers, tailors, X-ray assistants, CD sellers, female health workers, NGO activists, and administrators of girls’ schools is a recent phenomenon that is directly linked to the support of religious elements by our militaryintelligence establishment. JUI was never even on the political map till it got political legitimacy by the army. And it is the ISI’s support of the Taliban and religious parties that has emboldened the likes of Sufi Muhammad and Fazlullah. We must ask: why is it that reporters associated with KTN, Sindh TV, and Intikhab have been abducted and tortured, while Fazlullah’s FM radio was allowed to operate freely?

The biggest travesty is that Musharraf is using the self-perpetuated threat of religious militancy to justify his rule, claiming that he will be the force of stability. This is simply a contradiction in terms. Musharraf’s rule has made us second only to Iraq in terms of bombing operations and suicide attacks; hence, he is not even able to hold his ground in his own terrain which is national security and defence. What more has to happen for us to recognize that Pakistan has been destabilized for a long time now, and that the unquestioned and unaccounted practices of the military and intelligence are hugely responsible? Some people say: ok, so the army and agencies created the Pakistani Taliban, and now that the fundamentalists are on the offensive, only the army can reign them in. Such an approach is even more misguided, as it will only worsen the oppressions of military rule. Further, years and years of breeding religious militancy and encouraging Islamist politics will not go away with bombing Waziristan and Swat. We need a long term strategy involving rehabilitation, economic incentives, and political negotiation. Just like we are still struggling with Zia’s Islamization, we will be fighting Musharraf’s Islamization for a long time to come.

The Meaning of Democracy:  Because of the repressive tactics that the army routinely employs, military extremism and absolutism has remained publicly invisible to a large extent. Does this mean we ignore it? Supporters of Musharraf’s regime argue that he gave us economic growth. Does this justify the militarization of state, economy, and society? Does this validate systematic oppression and violence? I couldn’t bear the television coverage of the Lal Masjid episode, does this make the silencing of critique under PEMRA acceptable? I have personally experienced the gender biases and callousness of our courts, does this mean that the entire Supreme Court should be disposed off?

This is the time to make distinctions. We need to recognize that the current struggle is about protecting the Constitution, and about resisting the wholesale annihilation of the rule of law. It is not a personality contest between Musharraf, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Protestors are not impulsive fools who love Benazir or Nawaz Sharif – they are as disillusioned with “democratic” regimes as anyone else. Does this mean that we should now give up all hope and respect for political process? Do we simply accept the kingdom of a military dictator? We want a ready-made, perfect leader to lead us, but are unwilling to allow her or him to emerge because we keep accepting rampant abuses of the political process. The lesser-of-the-two evils argument just does not work: a military dictator is not accountable to anyone, will entrench the interests of the army, and will eventually show his true colors. And political history around the world has shown that a military dictator claiming to bring in “democracy” is a contradiction in terms. A political party still needs to get re-elected, and a rule that says no leader can be Prime Minister twice will ensure that new leaders will come up. The political spectrum is not even as limited as we think it is. There are several regional parties, the Labor Party, and the Tehrik-e-Insaaf which can promise to play a strong role in the future. But parties like the JUI and PML (Q) will only strengthen the forces of religious and military extremism.

Let’s assume that all parties are corrupt. Let’s think about how India had an emergency under Congress in the 70s, and a systematic genocide of Muslims under BJP. Let’s remember how the U.S. under Bush is continuing to devastate Afghanistan and Iraq . Does this mean that the militaries in the two countries should take over for the sake of “stability?” Democracies do not work perfectly anywhere, yet they are the most common form of governance because they come the closest to ensuring both accountability and stability.

Ultimately, democracy is not about procedural elections, but about the substantive principles of liberation, egalitarianism, and justice. The democracies of the world have gotten to where they are because of citizens’ engagement. Self-determination and democracy was not given on a platter by monarchs and colonizers – every victory was a result of protests, struggles, and social movements. Let’s not simplistically equate any political party’s reinstatement with a “transition to democracy.” In our country, the transition was already happening thanks to the renewed strength of our Supreme Court. It is the continuing struggle to resist the emergency, restore the Constitution, and reinstate the Supreme Court that is the actual stuff of democracy – it’s democracy in the making – and we need to support it in every way that we can. And if and when we succeed, the struggle by no means is over. Military dominance, political corruption, religious extremism, media sensationalism, and judicial negligence will not magically disappear. Instead of dwelling in self-serving apathy and cynicism, we, as citizens, need to constantly play our part in reforming the status quo and striving towards a better future for our country. That is everyone’s responsibility, not just of judges, military officials and politicians.

Cynicism is the Opium of the Elite:  As elites, consumed by our work and social lives, we have been too depoliticized and disconnected to care. We don’t even follow the news regularly, and may not know how the judiciary was upholding several causes of social and economic justice. There have been hundreds of petitions of aggrieved citizens who requested the Supreme Court to hear their voices, or take suo moto action, because they had no other recourse. And the judiciary was listening. It might have been corrupt, brash and naïve, but it showed concern. And unlike the shameless legislature, executive, and most of the citizenry, the lawyers and judges who have been hounded for months are still bravely refusing to accept an elitist and military-dominated status quo. What power are they getting by risking their lives and the security of their families? Why, for once, can we not think about their struggle with the seriousness that it demands?

It’s all too easy to disparage protesting students as well by saying that they are immature, trying to act cool and pseudo-revolutionary, or just joining the bandwagon. Why are we so bent on dismissing them instead of giving them credit? If students are protesting at an unprecedented scale, surely there must be something about the situation that is sparking this agitation? They are not protesting for party politics, nor simply because their own professors have been arrested. They are genuinely frustrated, and refuse to watch tyranny take root. Life and politics is messy and confusing, so they obviously do not have all the answers and are also uncertain about what the future will bring. Yet, despite tremendous fears in these times of repression, they have the integrity and courage to take a stance.

And like them, we all must take a stance. This is not the time to dilly-dally and say: “I don’t support the emergency but the protests are not worthy enough a cause” and “I think the repression is inhuman but we have to see what choices we have as a nation.” As Howard Zinn said in the People’s History of the United States, it’s where you put the “but” that makes unjust use of power and violence possible. One can instead say, “Musharraf did many good things for the country but a violently enforced military mullah- intelligence alliance with no respect for rule of law and civil liberties is simply unacceptable.”

One can criticize any stance – which is only a way to not take any stance at all. It is always convenient to sit back, observe, and be critical and cynical as if that makes us all intellectual. This is the surest way to escape ever standing up for anything, and masking one’s own ignorance, and unwillingness to engage. But silence is a form of political action, and it has strong consequences especially in these severe times. By not standing up and vocalizing our discontent with this kind of draconian action, we are implicitly telling the regime (and all subsequent regimes) that it is ok for them to do whatever they please, and we will sit idle like innocent bystanders. Our fatalistic (“whatever will be will be”), over-critical (“I don’t agree with anything”), and cynical (“this is such a crazy farce”) postures are not only unfair to those who are willing to struggle and sacrifice, but they in effect help to sustain the status quo.

If we are scared of instability due to protests, and Musharraf’s departure, we must ask ourselves: what is our definition of stability? Is rising military and religious extremism not enough? Is the decimation of the highest judicial institution not enough? Are over 5,000 indiscriminate and unlawful arrests not enough? What about the anti-terrorism and sedition cases against innocent people? Are the laws for court-marshalling citizens also acceptable, so the army-intelligence regime can simply press “delete” on citizens like it did on the Supreme Court? Is the “Musharraf is necessary” theory so unfalsifiable that no amount of violence and human rights abuse will move us into action? Do we believe in any values, and have we ever stood up for anything? Does it really have to be the intimidation or arrest of a loved one that shakes us out of our apathy?

If we don’t have the courage to protest ourselves, we should at least not trivialize and ridicule the efforts of those who do. Better still, we should express our solidarity, lend support, and actively shape this defining historic moment. We always have a choice.

Following paper is a preamble to recommendations by DR BHASHAYAM KASTURI and PANKAJ MEHRA for Indian covert action against Pakistan, already published by PAKISTAN Special this month.

Readers can go through and link both articles in the light of present turmoil in Pakistan and draw their own conclusions. Your views and comments are welcomed.

India, in the late 50s and 60s with the help of the CIA aided the Tibetan rebellion, providing training facilities in India . The 1962 border war with China led to the establishment of several organisations that are today under the Cabinet Secretariat, the Special Frontier Force (Establishment 22 at Chakrata) and Special Services Bureau. Additionally, a group was raised with the objective of carrying out aerial reconnaissance of China and Tibet , the Aviation Research Centre (ARC). One source suggests that at Charbatia in December 1964 a U-2 aircraft was deployed for operations over Tibet . The Tibet operation continued till the early 60s when the CIA, withdrew its operations on Indian soil and moved to Nepal .

Then in the late sixties, the need for an organisation tasked with gathering external intelligence led to the formation of RAW, and the Directorate General of Security was transferred from IB to RAW. As the Bangladesh crisis arose, RAW was given the task of gathering intelligence and undertaking covert missions, including pro-insurgency. This is the most successful operation till date, publicly written about, carried out, involving the training of the Mukti Bahini of East Pakistan and their role in helping the Indian military intervention.

The operation involved getting the freedom fighters in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh ) together and training and arming them. This was essentially a Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) operation, with the Indian army providing the training infrastructure. The Mukti Bahini was formed in January 1971 and for the next ten months people who came across the border were selected for training. By September-November 1971, these forces were infiltrated into East Pakistan for covert missions, including sabotage of lines of communication and command and control centres.

When war did officially break out on 3 December, the Mukti Bahini was ready, (just like the French resistance in 1944, when Operation Overlord the invasion at Normandy began). The Mukti Bahini helped Indian troops find their way, harassed Pak troops and generally made itself a nuisance. Naval Mukti Bahini divers planted mines in the harbours around Bangladesh and sunk many merchant and warships, playing a crucial role in blockading the ports. Another facet of covert action was witnessed in the trans-border attacks carried out by the Special Frontier Force (SFF) in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Thus a combination of para-military action in the form of the Mukti Bahini and direct covert action using special forces, complimented the main military action in the 1971 Bangladesh war. The benefits accruing from coordinated covert action allowed implementation of foreign policy to secure national interests namely liberation of East Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh .

Subsequently measures taken to integrate Sikkim into the Indian Union by the RAW proved crucial. One authority states that RAW performed the task of counter-intelligence in Sikkim preventing foreign agencies from getting a foothold in the sensitive Himalayan kingdom and allowing it to accede to India . But soon after the successful mounting of Bangladesh and Sikkim operation, leading to the latter’s integration as a state in the Indian union, came the Sri Lanka operation. This pro-insurgency operation launched by Mrs Gandhi during her second term in office, meant to train Tamil separatists followed the same lines of the 1971 case. Equipping and training of insurgents from across the Palk Straits took place on Indian soil, in the state of Tamil Nadu and in places as far as, Chakrata and Dehradun. With the active support of the state and central government, Indian intelligence agencies took up the task with gusto. But what was missing was the broad institutional oversight so essential for tying up the loose ends. Foreign policy makers and defence planners were scarcely aware of what was happening as political masters changed and priorities shifted.

Secrecy is undoubtedly called for in operations of this sort. But as the Iran-Contra affair in America showed, in the Sri Lanka operations also one part of the government did not know what the other was doing. In the Indian case, while RAW knew what it was doing politically, neither it nor the government was unable to fathom the potential for trouble that was generated by this operation. This was because the mission sought to achieve too much at one time. The number of groups being trained were one too many and difficult to control. No accountability existed and eventually not enough attention was paid to the risks of losing control over the insurgents. Thus by the time Mrs Indira Gandhi was killed in 1984, and Rajiv became prime minister the priorities changed and so did policy towards Sri Lanka .

In politico-military terms, covert action eventually proved to be of little use when the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) went into Sri Lanka in 1987. For the simple reason that intelligence on the insurgents trained by India was not forthcoming. Additionally, the intelligence agencies continued to covertly continue political dealings with the insurgents to suit their ends, even during the IPKF’s stay in Sri Lanka . This undermined the foreign policy goal of sending a peacekeeping force to restore peace in Sri Lanka . The problem was that too many prime ministers were involved in the Sri Lanka episode, resulting in several conflicting decisions. Also involvement of state leaders like MG Ramachandran created more complications for command and control.

Intelligence agencies have been involved in various covert acts, both within India and in the surrounding region. Intelligence agencies often make alliances and then forget to inform their cousins resulting in confusion. In February 1998, the Armed Forces intercepted ships at sea off the Andamans killing six people and arresting 73 others. This was essentially a "sting" operation carried out by MI in collaboration with their Burmese counterparts. But the result was a big hue and cry.

In April, the leader of the National Unity Party of Arakans (NUPA) wrote to the Defence Minister that the men abroad the ship were in fact Arakanese revolutionaries who were cooperating with the Indians. He wrote, "The Indian military intelligence had okayed our voyage and that is why we entered Indian territorial waters to avoid the Burmese Navy." The issue is whether it was a case of military intelligence not giving the information to its forces in the field in time or it was a case of giving up its people. Maung wrote, "We were cooperating with each other. The Indians asked us for help to track down gunrunners carrying weapons to Northeast India and we helped them. So it came as a shock to us that our ship, about which the Indians were given full information, should be attacked." The point here is that at one level India is willing to help the pro-democracy movement in Burma, but due to the insurgents buying arms from South-East Asia and this having a direct influence on the insurgent movement in India’s north-east it becomes necessary for the army to curb such activity. The dichotomy in policy towards the region is a reflection of the lack of understanding how to secure vital interests in the north-east.

It needs recalling that in the 80s, RAW supported tribal and ethnic factions fighting the SLORC in Myanmar . One of the factions supported by India was the Kachin Independence Army. The Kachins, known more accurately as Jingphaws or Marus, account for some 3 per cent of Myanmar ’s ethnic population. They inhabit the north-east of the country and have the reputation for resorting to arms to assert what they believe are their rights.

A senior officer in RAW deputed to Bangkok in the 80s, made contact with Burmese underground leaders in the hope of gaining some information. Then this officer decided that the KIA could be beneficially used to channelise information. And RAW could aid them with money and arms. Having made contact, the idea was to get members of KIA into India for training and contact creation. After the controlling officer returned from Bangkok , infiltration of KIA cadres was started. They came as students, youths touring India and helpers, sent for training to Chakrata and other locations in north and north-east. Arms and other material began to filter through to camps in North Myanmar and this reached its peak in 1991-92. Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram provided exfiltration sites, while some material went via Bangkok . This was the post election period when Aung Sang Suu Kyi had won but was not allowed to take power by SLORC. All this was stopped by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, as part of his "Look East" policy.

Looking back, one may well ask what purpose did this operation serve? What national interests or foreign policy goals did it serve? Keeping in mind the dimension of policy in the 80s, that of coercive diplomacy there is little doubt that the Government thought it fit to aid all rebels across the borders, wherever it suited us. But on many an occasion it backfired, as it did in Sri Lanka .

There is one other aspect of covert action that requires highlighting in the present study. Nation-states also engage in action within the territorial confines of the country for politico-military aims, such as pro-insurgency or counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism. Since the institutional framework for covert action exists in most countries in the South Asian region, indulging in domestic covert action is a continuing tool for governments. In India for instance, it was suggested that SSB was used to raise and train the Bodos in the late 80s in an effort to counter other groups in the region. Their employment to fulfil political goals has affected their organisation and performance and impinges on their role, which is really to engage in "stay-behind" operations.

The ISI has been involved in covert action in various parts of India since the 80s. The main focus has been on Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir. Infiltration of arms and drugs into India , along with men to stoke insurgencies has been common. For Jammu & Kashmir, the ISI has a special cell to fuel the insurgency. It has been responsible for the setting up and maintenance of training camps in POK and Pakistan , the provision of arms and equipment, infiltration and exfiltration of both recruits and trained militants into the Valley. The entire plan to infiltrate Kashmir and launch a covert low-intensity war there has been described in the part fact, part fictionalised Operation Topac in 1989. The Pak strategy has followed the lines suggested in this analysis.

The Kashmir operation was an offshoot of the US-Pakistan fight against Soviet Union . The CIA backed the Mujahadeen, via the ISI. The latter siphoned off money and weapons meant for Afghanistan to stoke the insurgency in Kashmir . But infiltration into the Valley has been taking place on a low key since the early eighties, first of Kashmiris who were alienated from India and currently of Pak mercenaries, including criminals and foreign soldiers of fortune from Afghanistan and further afield. This occurred through training camps in POK and Pakistan proper.

The enormous powers enjoyed by ISI were brought to the notice of Robert Gates in May 1990 on a visit to India and Pakistan . Benazir Bhutto apparently expressed her helplessness to Gates, in controlling the training camps run by ISI in POK and Afghanistan used for anti-India operations. Even accounting for an element of exaggeration, the illustration speaks much for the ISI’s independence. Being a military controlled organisation, covert operations are tightly controlled. A more recent statement by Benazir Bhutto portrays an intelligence operation that has run amok and that one wields enormous power within Pakistan .

Most intelligence organisations the world over have a department or section for active measures. Recruitment and training is often based on special operations lines involving, parachuting, electronics, weapons and languages. Area orientation and mobility along with, light but powerful weaponry for fire fighting is essential for covert operations teams. The use of covert action to support national foreign and security policy has been commonplace amongst intelligence agencies round the world. Their success or failure has often depended on the command and control, and the level of involvement of political controllers. India ’s experience shows that results have often been positive when proper attention was paid to proper control and coordination. When this has not been possible misuse of covert assets has taken place. This combined with the duplication of covert efforts has reduced the impact of such action on national security.

Following recommendations prepared by DR BHASHAYAM KASTURI and PANKAJ MEHRA, both Indian security affairs specialists date back to year 2000. Needless to point out that subject plan is well in advanced execution stage. Undoubtedly CIA, KHAD and Mosad remain natural and active supporters of RAW in achieving it's goals

India has limited experience of covert operations against its western neighbor. Clandestine electronic intelligence gathering and aerial reconnaissance gives it some part of the picture. Additionally, it has gained experience in exfiltrating agents into POK into the training camps and this has helped in keeping tabs on activity in the POK region. But India's ability to influence events in Pakistan itself is limited. Small-scale moral and material support does go out to ethnic groups in Pakistan and some effort is made to infiltrate 'spies' by Military Intelligence in the border regions. But the larger picture is still dependent on Technical/electronic intelligence and even here capability to tap landlines in Pakistan is limited. Human intelligence from within Pakistan is much less than required. It is however suggested by one source on the Internet that RAW has over 35,000 agents in Pakistan.

Therefore, plans have to be made to covertly gather intelligence from inside Pakistan to help in foreign policy objective of breaking the monopoly of the ISI and army over Pakistan. India has to have a plan of action to destabilize Pakistan, its economy and society, to the extent that it gives us leverage in foreign policy terms. It must however, be clear that it is not in India's interests to have a disintegrated Pakistan. The aim is to break the stranglehold of the intelligence agencies, the bureaucracy and the military in Pakistan.

The proposed strategy is to undertake covert passive and active measures against Pakistan including, psy. ops, disinformation, strikes in rear areas, border raids and so on. The last may include strikes by special forces against training camps in POK and Northern Areas. Such operations require a clear national will and motivation. They also require sustained funding from the political leadership and it requires highly trained and motivated manpower to execute this task. The objectives of such operations are to first, penetrate Pakistani society and its institutions of power. Obtaining intelligence from within the establishments of power is the main aim. Associated with this is the second, long-term aim of breaking the stranglehold of the main power brokers in Pakistan.

For the above mission, there is a need to create, to start with two sets of teams. First, a plans section and second, an operations section. The first will draw up the plans and stages for operations against Pakistan. Also recruiting agents for the task and training them should be completed in about six months. Planning from conception to actual operations should take 8-12 months, depending on the resources and manpower available. Once this is achieved the operations begin.

The operation can be politically cleared by RAW and then a separate section can be raised under the Director RAW, drawing the best talent from within and other agencies including the army, all volunteers of course. Known as Plans Directorate (PD), this will mastermind the operation. Personnel for Strike Directorate (SD) should be picked from SSB, Army para-commandos and NSG. For the agents and sleepers recruitment has to be from outside. The need to know principle has to be strictly followed. Accountability should be from Prime Minister, National Security Advisor, to Director RAW and to PD head.

The entire operation can be divided into three phases. First phase is penetration and setting up of networks. Second phase is to begin operations in rear areas. Strikes against soft targets in Sind, Baluchistan and Northern Areas. These will make the enemy react and make them sensitive.

The main aim is to infiltrate and subvert Pak institutions, the police, communication network and other important organizations. To this end, it makes sense to penetrate Pakistan from two sides, from outside the sub-continent and from POK. Then, in the next stage, focus moves to organizing and training subversive elements. These groups would target communication and logistic lines inside POK. Threatening the Mangla dam or Kahuta for instance, would be a major psychological factor. Third phase is hitting hard targets. First, to carry out disinformation campaign carried out by agent provocateurs and others. A few expendable agents are used to plant false information on police and intelligence agencies. At this stage, the strike teams begin hitting hard targets like economic centers, financial markets (like Karachi), ports and the like. Military installations like ammunition dumps, communication centers, airfields can be targeted in case a war breaks out. Otherwise the aim is to penetrate and gather intelligence with the intention of breaking the stranglehold of the military over Pakistan society.

The mission entails sending two teams of men (and women) into Pakistan for two separate missions. This first team will consist of sleepers, and agent provocateurs, and the second team will be the strike force. The sleepers and agents will consist of network builders and specialists who will recruit local people for both disinformation and strikes in the rear areas of Pakistan. The agent provocateurs will be placed such that they can engage in disinformation and activate sources within who can be expendable when required. The second team is for strikes against key targets of economic and military importance.

Both teams will have to be infiltrated on the basis of genuine documents and placements in Pakistan. Identities can range from middle level social workers, journalists and political workers. Crucially, the persons selected for this job will have to be extensively trained for operations in living off the land in Pakistan. One may at this stage refer to the operation conducted by the Israeli Mossad in Syria aimed at the KHAD party. The agent was an Israeli but was trained to behave and live like a Muslim.16 Therefore it should not be difficult to train an Indian, Hindu or Muslim to live in Pakistan. The key lies in creating excellent and plausible identities. Training has to be rigorous and thorough. Training will also be common initially and then separate and compartmentalized for the two teams - one, sleepers and agent provocateurs and two, demolition teams that will serve as strike teams in the rear.

While both teams need training in explosives, weapons and communications, each has a specific role, which calls for intensive training. For the sleeper the aim is to penetrate Pakistani society and build a local network for further infiltration. The important thing is therefore for these members to be 'Islamised.' For the strike teams it is going further afield, into Sind, Baluchistan and Northern Areas. This means differing identities and covers; identities are important. The first team has to consist of "Pakistani nationals." Punjabi or Sindhis, who are from abroad, can be targeted. Some thought can be given to recruiting people from the Asian community in UK. Some members can be selected from Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan. For those coming in from the west, penetration point is obviously the United Kingdom, USA or Europe. Even the Middle East can be used. In other words, the potential areas for recruitment are large and this needs to be analyzed carefully.

The strike teams could penetrate from Afghanistan or Tajikistan. The NWFP is full of Afghan refugees and the Northern Areas have Turks, Tajiks and Uzbeks. Finding these persons who are reliable and capable is going to be the tough part, but not impossible.

Another option is to exfiltrate these teams from Indian soil. Therefore, the strike teams could penetrate from northern Kashmir. The northern areas of Jammu & Kashmir bordering Gilgit and Baltistan, mainly Kargil is a Shia dominated region, this could also serve as a recruiting base. There are also traditional routes that could be used for exfiltration into POK.

Additionally, India can find local recruits from amongst the Turks and Tajiks in these regions who could act as couriers and informants. Similarly, in POK the Gujjars and Bakkarwals can be recruited for the same purpose. Seasonal migrants and sheepherders come from the Northern Areas, Chitral and Koistan areas. They can also be recruited. The aim of penetrating the strike teams is to get them to strike in the rear areas of Pakistan. The entire infiltration process of both teams, will take at least one year. Then it is a slow task of making inroads into Pak society.

So it is clear that mission objectives of both teams are different and require different infiltration and exfiltration routes. As suggested above, the first team cannot jump off from India; the second might, given the right circumstances. The sleepers and agent provocateurs are always in danger of exposure. Thus their exfiltration will depend on their own resources and on the overall command and control of the mission. If mission control did want to abandon the task, then alternative exfilitration routes will require to be planned. The strike teams consisting of individuals, usually two to four must have routes of escape, and this is possible in those areas bordering India. It is thought best, diplomatically, at some stage to use Tajikistan as the exfilitration route for those employed in the Northern Areas and surrounding regions. Those in Baluchistan, Sind and NWFP will have to use Afghanistan or get to the Arabian Sea for exfiltration.

The first team should consist of 10-20 persons, both men and women who will be sent to Islamabad, Karachi, Rawalpindi and Lahore. The second team, consisting of only men will go to towns in Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP, as also the areas of Gilgit and Chitral. Numbers will depend on how much rear area attack is envisaged, perhaps initial numbers may be 8-10 in groups of two, to each region. The entire operation has to be planned keeping in mind that the initial period of infiltration and consolidation should be about four-six months. And then once the strike teams have got into place, situations can be created.

The aim of the first team is to settle in Pakistan, infiltrate society, make inroads and build networks for information gathering and find niches in high places. The agent provocateurs will be expendable and need to be locally recruited, though for the sake of authenticity, one or two sleepers need to be expendable also. Key areas of penetration are the bureaucracy, the army, ISI, elite middle class and media. After a lull of a year, information should be leaked, through available means of the existence of these agent provocateurs, who will have in their possession, propaganda material, disinformation material and generally stories that lull Pakistani intelligence into a sense of complacency that they have achieved a coup. Further, as the Russians so successfully did with the CIA and MI-6, the agent provocateurs should talk of moles and other sleepers in the Pak military and intelligence establishment to create internal dissension.

Once this leads to internal turmoil, it is time to activate the strike teams who will launch rear area attacks on installations of economic and military value. This will lead to further conspiracy theories being floated, leading to political uncertainty. The risk that this entails is that it will weaken the democratic process and possibly lead to military rule in Pakistan, but that is a contingency that India has to prepare for. The aim of strikes is to create a situation where the establishment is caught in an over-reach situation. The rear areas, which are under the administrative control of Pakistan, but given its tribal and ethnic composition are quite independent, can be suitably engaged by India for its own purposes. Strikes will mean deploying more police and para-military troops to these regions and will stretch the Pak establishment.

Surprise and timing are an important element in these missions and those in the strike formations should be constantly on the move, working from small towns, crowded market places and religious places. Rear area operations are to succeed by strikes in a few important cities and installations of economic value such as oil fields and tankers. Karachi city and its port is an example. Period of operations will depend on the nature of Pakistani response; if they do according to plan then teams can be exfiltrated. If they need to be in for some more time, then further deception plans need to be put into operation.

The duration of operations in most cases is stretchable. The first phase may take anything between one and three years, while the second phase will be carried out in synchronized fashion for a month or two in one place and then move on to another target. After a respite of a few months it will be time to carry out operations again. The long-term objective is to build information networks in Pakistan that will provide a human intelligence source for India and additionally it will help us make inroads into the military establishment and bureaucracy.  Along with the strike missions carried out by the second team, plans may be made to carry out heliborne operations and SF strikes in the border regions against militant training camps and other suitable targets. Forces for this are already available in the form of the National Security Guards and Indian Army para-commandos. These can be configured and trained for operations in a near-war like situation or simultaneously with the covert strike missions outlined above. All this of course requires a national security policy that seeks to engage and contain Pakistan in foreign policy terms.

To aid this process and to improve intelligence gathering on Pakistan the above covert action plan is commended to the Indian decision-maker and political leadership. The Indian diplomatic and security response to Pakistan sponsored terrorism has often been to fight fires within after the incidents have taken place. Additionally, there is a dialogue track, which seeks to engage Pakistan in a meaningful bilateral exchange. But little thought is given to the possibility of engaging in covert operations on a scale suggested above and its usefulness as a tool of diplomacy. The intention as stated above is not to help the disintegration of Pakistan but to engage Pakistan in a battle in which the key players, the army, ISI and bureaucracy will get embroiled to an extent that it creates conditions for, first Pakistan's disengagement from the sub-continent and second, may help the process of bilateral dialogue.

BY: SHIREEN MAZARI

What is with Pakistanis and the Americans? Despite over sixty-one years of independence; despite our successful struggle to acquire nuclear capability in the face of massive hurdles put in our way by these folk, despite the dismal record of our past military alliance with the US and its allies; despite the constant abuse being hurled at us Pakistanis in particular and Muslims in general, by them, post-9/11, we have continued to sustain the imperialists and neo imperialists in their misplaced assumption of the "White Man's Burden".

How else can we explain our continuing tolerance of the abuse — a form of psychological terrorisation — being meted out to us by the US? Their Administration continues with its mantra of "do more", and continues to scamper to build new political favourites as old ones lose domestic currency. Their politicians in and out of Congress hysterically threaten us with dire aid cut-offs if we do not deliver — although the only delivery they will ever be satisfied with is the handing over of our nuclear assets, Dr Khan and at least an Osama look-alike to appease their populace. As for the US media, we are definitely their bete noir, not least because our leadership is so readily accessible and prone to erring on the side of indiscretion — including our leadership-in-waiting. All and sundry make pronouncements on sensitive foreign policy issues with no thought to the implications and unintended consequences.

As for the US military, it is playing an interesting double game at the moment. The command in Washington critiques us, while at the operational level on the ground in the Trilateral Commission, they feign an atmosphere of camaraderie and goodwill which makes our local commanders adopt an unnecessarily accommodative approach towards them.

It is in this bizarre environment that our own security situation has been vitiated even as we have sought to please the US ad nauseum. Certainly, we have had a terrorist problem even before 9/11, but the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan has distorted our indigenous terrorist problem as well as aggravating it. To make matters worse, the US has adopted a duplicitous and treacherous strategy vis a vis the Pakistani state. On the one hand, it wants us to fight its designed war against terror, but it is itself supporting Baloch terrorist groups with the aim of destabilising both Iran's Sistan and Pakistan's Balochistan. The use of terror group Jundullah by the US against the Iranian state has been discussed in the US media. Additionally, the US has done nothing to push the Karzai government to close the offices of Pakistani terrorist groups like the BLA — now renamed the Baloch Republican Army, after the UK declared BLA a terrorist organisation.

This is just the tip of the iceberg. US citizens joined some Baloch expats in 2006 to launch the so-called "American friends of Balochistan" (AFB) in Washington DC with Robert Selle, apparently a journalist, as its chairman. The aim of the group is to separate Balochistan from Pakistan and its level of funding tends to show more than a passive acceptance by the US establishment. Interestingly, the group was formed a year after French diplomat Frederic Grare went to Washington and began claiming expertise on Balochistan.

Then there is the Baloch Society of North America, established in 2005, which is active against both the Pakistani and Iranian states and has access also in Canada and the UK, post the BLA ban. There is also a big question mark over the diversion of funds received from international donors by the World Sindhi Congress (WSC) and World Sindh Institute (WSI), to terrorists in Pakistan rather than for the philanthropic purposes for which the funding was given. Both these organisations have given financial support to the Sindh Liberation Army which has claimed responsibility for a number of bomb blasts in Sindh. To make matters worse, US officials even maintain contact with members of these groups in Pakistan.

The issue is why America has failed to monitor or curtail such activities emanating from its territory. After all, we all know that terrorist organisations have to have their political wings to raise funds and the US has attacked many religious groups on this count in Pakistan. We also know how Washington has emphasised the issue of terrorist financing and many Muslim charities have suffered on this count. Are we not interested in some level of reciprocity from the US?

With all these shenanigans which directly undermine our security, we have allowed US bases in the sensitive province of Balochistan, as well as in Sindh, and there is now evidence that they are also using a short refurbished runway near Tarbela for launching Predator flights. With all this logistical support offered by Pakistan, where is the US reciprocity on anti-terrorism? Of course, if we Pakistanis had even an iota of dignity, we would stop all logistical support and let Congress do its worst. What will that be? US marines coming into Pakistan? They can barely manage Iraq and Afghanistan at the moment.

Unfortunately, despite being abused all around, we continue to do US bidding — much against our own long term interests. Now we hear US military personnel are coming in to not only train our paramilitary forces but also to accompany them on missions within Pakistan. There has also been talk of the US "training" our military in counter-insurgency. What absurdities are we reducing ourselves to? Has no one studied the US's dismal record in this field — both in Vietnam and Iraq, not to mention in our own neighbourhood in Afghanistan? All that will happen with the additional influx of US military personnel in Pakistan is more acts of terror against our own security forces.

The only way to fight a successful war on terror against our own indigenous terrorist problem is to begin thinning out US personnel from Pakistan and adopting a holistic approach in dealing with the tribals. To make it a perceptually credible national effort we have to create space between ourselves and the Americans so that our security forces can become more effective with local support. Unless the locals flush out the terrorists, the state will see no success in this war. This is where the ANP victory can play a crucial role in a two-pronged strategy of dialogue, development and establishment of law and order. We have to overcome the psychological confidence deficit that prevents us from creating the necessary distance between ourselves and the US.

Is it not interesting that post the ANP victory in NWFP, when it was seen that the local people had rejected the extremists and elections had been conducted more or less peacefully in that province, and there was hope of the new political leadership using a policy of dialogue to isolate the militants and terrorists — something that went against the US policy — suddenly we have been hit with a spate of suicide attacks with even funerals being targeted — something that has not happened before.

Unfortunately, so far our ruling elite seem unable or unwilling to see the US design for what it is: a weakening of the Pakistani state and nation with perhaps a long term goal of balkanisation. After all, US scholars with close links to the establishment are referring increasingly to this end goal. Yet even here we seem to retain a strange subservience and continue to give academic space to perennial Pakistan-bashers, especially in terms of access to data and information. Such is our continuing hangover of kowtowing to old and new imperialist powers. No wonder we Pakistanis today face a double-headed terrorist threat: psychological terrorisation of the state by the US, and the physical home grown militant terrorism. One feeds on the other.

By: ERIC SCHMITT and DAVID E. SANGER
American officials reached a quiet understanding with Pakistan’s leader last month to intensify secret strikes against suspected terrorists by pilotless aircraft launched in Pakistan, senior officials in both governments say. But the prospect of changes in Pakistan’s government has the Bush administration worried that the new operations could be curtailed.

Among other things, the new arrangements allowed an increase in the number and scope of patrols and strikes by armed Predator surveillance aircraft launched from a secret base in Pakistan — a far more aggressive strategy to attack Al Qaeda and the Taliban than had existed before.

But since opposition parties emerged victorious from the parliamentary election early this week, American officials are worried that the new, more permissive arrangement could be choked off in its infancy.

In the weeks before Monday’s election, a series of meetings among President Bush’s national security advisers resulted in a significant relaxation of the rules under which American forces could aim attacks at suspected Qaeda and Taliban fighters in the tribal areas near Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan.

The change, described by senior American and Pakistani officials who would not speak for attribution because of the classified nature of the program, allows American military commanders greater leeway to choose from what one official who took part in the debate called “a Chinese menu” of strike options.

Instead of having to confirm the identity of a suspected militant leader before attacking, this shift allowed American operators to strike convoys of vehicles that bear the characteristics of Qaeda or Taliban leaders on the run, for instance, so long as the risk of civilian casualties is judged to be low.

The new, looser rules of engagement may have their biggest impact at a secret Central Intelligence Agency base in Pakistan whose existence was described by American and Pakistani officials who had previously kept it secret to avoid embarrassing President Pervez Musharraf politically. Mr. Musharraf, whose party lost in this week’s election by margins that surprised American officials, has been accused by political rivals of being too close to the United States.

The base in Pakistan is home to a handful of Predators — unmanned aircraft that are controlled from the United States. Two Hellfire missiles from one of those Predators are believed to have killed a senior Qaeda commander, Abu Laith al-Libi, in northwest Pakistan last month, though a senior Pakistani official said his government had still not confirmed that Mr. Libi was among the dead. A C.I.A. spokesman declined on Thursday to comment on any operations in Pakistan.

The new agreements with Pakistan came after a trip to the country on Jan. 9 by Mike McConnell, the director of national intelligence, and Gen. Michael V. Hayden, the C.I.A. director. The American officials met with Mr. Musharraf as well as with the new army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and offered a range of increased covert operations aimed at thwarting intensifying efforts by Al Qaeda and the Taliban to destabilize the Pakistani government.

But Bush administration officials and American counterterrorism experts are expressing concern that these arrangements could come under review or be scaled back by the winners of Pakistan’s parliamentary elections. The two winning parties have said they want to enter talks with Pashtun tribal leaders who opposed the military government of Mr. Musharraf and who at times have supported the Taliban and given refuge to foreign Qaeda fighters.

“A new government may be able to reach an accord with the militants, and that would buy the government a certain respite,” said Robert L. Grenier, a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Counterterrorism Center. “But that would give the militants space to provide safe haven to Al Qaeda and other extremists engaged in attacks in Afghanistan.”

Xenia Dormandy, the director for South Asia at the National Security Council until 2005, said Thursday that if talks resulted in the kind of truce — and pullback of Pakistani troops — that Mr. Musharraf negotiated nearly two years ago, the militants would probably continue to gain strength.

“If they try to replicate what we’ve already seen, I don’t know why the result would be any different,” she said. But she added that if the Pakistani military remained in the area, the government might retain some leverage.

The question of what to do next in Pakistan is likely to preoccupy the Bush administration in its last year. Officials say there is clear, if unstated, pressure to make a last effort to capture or kill Osama bin Laden before Mr. Bush leaves office. But several senior officials in the State Department have been warning that the administration’s full-scale backing of Mr. Musharraf was a wrong-headed strategy that could now blow up.

Other administration officials warned not to read too much into the initial comments from Asif Ali Zardari, the leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party and widower of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, about reaching accords with the tribal leaders. Mr. Zardari, they noted, has made clear that he wants to defeat terrorism.

Opposition parties and analysts say American officials were misinterpreting the outcome of the elections, which were dominated by the country’s liberal, secular parties. An alliance of religious parties that controlled the provincial government in the North-West Frontier Province was driven from power and even lost the majority of seats in the tribal areas.

Opposition parties say a new civilian-led government will be more effective at countering militancy than the military-dominated one under Mr. Musharraf. They say that Mr. Musharraf’s strategy has failed and that a new approach is needed.

Instead, the opposition parties have called for a strategy in the tribal areas similar to the new counterinsurgency strategies employed by the American military in Afghanistan and Iraq. There, the United States has tried to use a combination of military force, reconstruction and political dialogue to turn local tribes against militants.

The question, senior American and Pakistani officials said Thursday, was how the strategy to accomplish these common goals might change.

“In the short term, there will be some confusion and some hiccups,” said Henry A. Crumpton, a former top State Department counterterrorism official. “But in the medium and longer term, there will be continued and perhaps even closer cooperation, because of our mutual interests.”

BY: COL(RETD) DANIEL SMITH

A prominent politician of a “third world” country is killed by “unknown foreign parties.”

The dead politician either was at odds with the ruling party or power center or had recently offended an ethnic or sectarian minority.

The assassination threatens to or actually paralyzes the country’s political life.

At least titular control of the political party of the deceased former leader passes to the next of kin, with results very uncertain for weeks or months.

International pressure forces the country’s head of state to accept international “technical” assistance in the investigation. 

In the end, nothing is proven, nothing is resolved.

Indira Gandhi: In October 1984, when India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was killed by two of her Sikh bodyguards in retaliation for ordering the Indian army’s assault on the Sikh’s Golden Temple in Amritsar , more than 1,000 rioters were dead within hours. Indira’s son Rajiv succeeded his mother. (Rajiv was later killed by a bomb while campaigning in 1991 in Tamil Nadu by suspected agents of Sri Lanka ’s rebel Tamil Tigers who resented Rajiv’s dispatch of troops when he was prime minister to intervene as “peace-makers” in the island’s civil war. Sonia, Rajiv’s widow, was instrumental in rebuilding Rajiv’s Congress Party and led them to victory in 2004. But as she was foreign-born, she was unable to become prime minister.)

Kabila, Hariri:In January 2001, just days after finally dislodging armed opposition from Kinshasa , The Democratic Republic of Congo’s new leader, Laurent Kabila, was shot in the presidential palace. His son, Joseph, inherited a war-torn country that, seven years on and with a 17,000-strong United Nations peacekeeping force in the country, is still verging on state failure.

Musharraf and Blame: And that brings us back to December 27, 2007 in Pakistan, the day Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in Rawalpindi – less than two weeks before the January 8 parliamentary elections.

It could hardly do otherwise. The alternatives, which range from “mere” incompetence to active collusion with or even direction of extremists, aren’t just bad. They’re disastrous.

And More Blame: Spokespersons for the Musharraf government, thrown on the defensive by accusations that government-provided security for Bhutto was not only lax but totally non-existent, gave conflicting accounts of the cause of death. Then they were entirely discredited by video footage of the attack obtained from a number of private citizens who had come to see and hear the former prime minister. Moreover, in a CBS “60 Minutes” interview aired January 6, Musharraf blamed Bhutto for ignoring threats to her life and taking unnecessary and provocative risks.

Yet, days later, Musharraf announced that Britain’s New Scotland Yard would provide technical assistance to Pakistani investigators as the latter tried to piece together what happened and why the 100 security personnel present at the campaign stop (as asserted by Musharraf in a meeting with Western correspondents) did not thwart the assassination.

Pakistani Peacekeepers: Another possible effect could be felt at the United Nations. The question is whether Islamabad will continue to be willing and able to supply large numbers of troops for the 20 current operations run by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. With 10,623 troops, observers, and police detailed to UN peacekeeping, Pakistan is the largest source (just under 13% of the total deployed “blue helmets”) of manpower for these efforts. It may come down to whom would Pakistan want to offend least – the United States in Afghanistan or the UN around the globe – should Islamabad decide to move more forces into internal security.

Nine Months Later: But these were thoughts enunciated nine months before Musharraf took off his general’s uniform, nine months before Bhutto’s assassination, nine months before Musharraf’s world turned upside down.

BY: SHAFQAT MEHMOOD
The easiest explanation is that Al Qaeda or Pakistani Taliban killed her and this is what the government has been pedaling. In twenty four hours, it not only determined the exact cause of Benazir Bhutto death but also solved the case. Baitullah Mehsud, we were told, is the culprit and there are tapes to prove it. I wish the interior ministry had shown similar efficiency in protecting her.

While these explanations are convenient let us look at Mr Mehsud's motives. There is little doubt that Benazir Bhutto hated Al Qaeda/Taliban and had vowed a relentless struggle against them. But, how was this any different from what Mr Musharraf has been saying and doing. What extra measures would she have undertaken that are not being used now. The only instrument available to her for crushing the extremists was Pakistan army and it is already engaged in a war against them. What was the extra that Ms Bhutto would have brought to the table that scared Al Qaeda/Taliban so much that they were determined to eliminate her?
Let us be clear. The October 18 attack on her procession, the day she arrived back in Pakistan from exile, was a serious assassination attempt. She survived because the armored truck protected her. What her killers learnt from this was that while a bomb may fail because of the protective measures, it disables the vehicle and makes it necessary for the target to be shifted to another vehicle. The process of shifting, which in Karachi was actually filmed by a TV crew, and further transportation in a non-amour plated vehicle, became the weak link in the security measures.

On December 27, the murder attempt included a suicide bomber, plus one or more shooters. In fact, for such a serious attempt, up to a dozen people may have been involved. Even if she had not come out of the hatch to wave to her supporters, they would have exploded the bomb and then attacked her while she was being shifted and transported in an unprotected vehicle. Her coming out just made it easier for the killers and the sequence was reversed. They were determined to get her this time.

I am not ruling out the Al Qaeda/Taliban as the suspects but the relentless desire to kill her requires a bigger motive than the fear of a focused drive against them. The state is already taking them on and I don't believe holding its punches. What else could Benazir have done? It is this that makes the easy explanation of their involvement suspect. They may have wanted her dead but it was probably in a general sense, just as they want all their opponents dead. Their going after her again and again lacks a specific focused motive.

If not the Pakistani Taliban, then who else? For this, one has to look at a bigger scenario that may sound conspiratorial but dealing with a tragedy like this, everything needs to be discussed. There is a body of opinion in this country that believes that United States is looking for an opportunity to take out our nuclear programme and dismantle the effective strength of our armed forces. Some columnists keep harping on this and one Ahmed Quraishi articulated this in an article that has been widely circulated.

His thesis is that movement against Musharraf after March 9, was sponsored by the US and everyone was paid including lawyers, journalists, judges etc. He further goes on to add that the real target was not Mr Musharraf but the Pakistan Army and by extension its nuclear arsenal . Also please remember that while referring to this period, Mr Musharraf keeps talking of conspiracy without actually explaining what it was. I don't know how much he subscribes to the Quraishi view, but the ire against Geo is allegedly because it tows the American line. Sponsored articles on the net actually accuse the channel of being directly in the Americans pay and of working against the interest of Pakistan.
This worldview that America is out to destabilize Pakistan and take control of its nuclear weapons, is bolstered by the statements of US leaders and reporting in the American media. Newsweek famously declared Pakistan the most dangerous country in the world, and op-ed articles in The Washington Post and The New York Times have called for US troops to go and 'secure' Pakistan's nuclear weapons. One piece by Frederick Kagan was particularly absurd and spoke in detail about how a million troops would be required for the invasion.

Other articles in prestigious papers also talk of how Mr Musharraf would not allow American special forces to operate in Pakistani tribal areas. Some hint at the involvement of the Pakistan army in the nuclear proliferation activities of Dr Abdul Qadeer Kh