PAKISTAN Special

Following recommendations prepared by DR BHASHAYAM KASTURI and PANKAJ MEHRA, both Indian security affairs specialists date back to year 2000. Needless to point out that subject plan is well in advanced execution stage. Undoubtedly CIA, KHAD and Mosad remain natural and active supporters of RAW in achieving it's goals

 

India has limited experience of covert operations against its western neighbor. Clandestine electronic intelligence gathering and aerial reconnaissance gives it some part of the picture. Additionally, it has gained experience in exfiltrating agents into POK into the training camps and this has helped in keeping tabs on activity in the POK region. But India's ability to influence events in Pakistan itself is limited. Small-scale moral and material support does go out to ethnic groups in Pakistan and some effort is made to infiltrate 'spies' by Military Intelligence in the border regions. But the larger picture is still dependent on Technical/electronic intelligence and even here capability to tap landlines in Pakistan is limited. Human intelligence from within Pakistan is much less than required. It is however suggested by one source on the Internet that RAW has over 35,000 agents in Pakistan.

Therefore, plans have to be made to covertly gather intelligence from inside Pakistan to help in foreign policy objective of breaking the monopoly of the ISI and army over Pakistan. India has to have a plan of action to destabilize Pakistan, its economy and society, to the extent that it gives us leverage in foreign policy terms. It must however, be clear that it is not in India's interests to have a disintegrated Pakistan. The aim is to break the stranglehold of the intelligence agencies, the bureaucracy and the military in Pakistan.

The proposed strategy is to undertake covert passive and active measures against Pakistan including, psy. ops, disinformation, strikes in rear areas, border raids and so on. The last may include strikes by special forces against training camps in POK and Northern Areas. Such operations require a clear national will and motivation. They also require sustained funding from the political leadership and it requires highly trained and motivated manpower to execute this task. The objectives of such operations are to first, penetrate Pakistani society and its institutions of power. Obtaining intelligence from within the establishments of power is the main aim. Associated with this is the second, long-term aim of breaking the stranglehold of the main power brokers in Pakistan.

For the above mission, there is a need to create, to start with two sets of teams. First, a plans section and second, an operations section. The first will draw up the plans and stages for operations against Pakistan. Also recruiting agents for the task and training them should be completed in about six months. Planning from conception to actual operations should take 8-12 months, depending on the resources and manpower available. Once this is achieved the operations begin.

The operation can be politically cleared by RAW and then a separate section can be raised under the Director RAW, drawing the best talent from within and other agencies including the army, all volunteers of course. Known as Plans Directorate (PD), this will mastermind the operation. Personnel for Strike Directorate (SD) should be picked from SSB, Army para-commandos and NSG. For the agents and sleepers recruitment has to be from outside. The need to know principle has to be strictly followed. Accountability should be from Prime Minister, National Security Advisor, to Director RAW and to PD head.

The entire operation can be divided into three phases. First phase is penetration and setting up of networks. Second phase is to begin operations in rear areas. Strikes against soft targets in Sind, Baluchistan and Northern Areas. These will make the enemy react and make them sensitive.

The main aim is to infiltrate and subvert Pak institutions, the police, communication network and other important organizations. To this end, it makes sense to penetrate Pakistan from two sides, from outside the sub-continent and from POK. Then, in the next stage, focus moves to organizing and training subversive elements. These groups would target communication and logistic lines inside POK. Threatening the Mangla dam or Kahuta for instance, would be a major psychological factor. Third phase is hitting hard targets. First, to carry out disinformation campaign carried out by agent provocateurs and others. A few expendable agents are used to plant false information on police and intelligence agencies. At this stage, the strike teams begin hitting hard targets like economic centers, financial markets (like Karachi), ports and the like. Military installations like ammunition dumps, communication centers, airfields can be targeted in case a war breaks out. Otherwise the aim is to penetrate and gather intelligence with the intention of breaking the stranglehold of the military over Pakistan society.

The mission entails sending two teams of men (and women) into Pakistan for two separate missions. This first team will consist of sleepers, and agent provocateurs, and the second team will be the strike force. The sleepers and agents will consist of network builders and specialists who will recruit local people for both disinformation and strikes in the rear areas of Pakistan. The agent provocateurs will be placed such that they can engage in disinformation and activate sources within who can be expendable when required. The second team is for strikes against key targets of economic and military importance.

Both teams will have to be infiltrated on the basis of genuine documents and placements in Pakistan. Identities can range from middle level social workers, journalists and political workers. Crucially, the persons selected for this job will have to be extensively trained for operations in living off the land in Pakistan. One may at this stage refer to the operation conducted by the Israeli Mossad in Syria aimed at the KHAD party. The agent was an Israeli but was trained to behave and live like a Muslim.16 Therefore it should not be difficult to train an Indian, Hindu or Muslim to live in Pakistan. The key lies in creating excellent and plausible identities. Training has to be rigorous and thorough. Training will also be common initially and then separate and compartmentalized for the two teams - one, sleepers and agent provocateurs and two, demolition teams that will serve as strike teams in the rear.

While both teams need training in explosives, weapons and communications, each has a specific role, which calls for intensive training. For the sleeper the aim is to penetrate Pakistani society and build a local network for further infiltration. The important thing is therefore for these members to be 'Islamised.' For the strike teams it is going further afield, into Sind, Baluchistan and Northern Areas. This means differing identities and covers; identities are important. The first team has to consist of "Pakistani nationals." Punjabi or Sindhis, who are from abroad, can be targeted. Some thought can be given to recruiting people from the Asian community in UK. Some members can be selected from Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan. For those coming in from the west, penetration point is obviously the United Kingdom, USA or Europe. Even the Middle East can be used. In other words, the potential areas for recruitment are large and this needs to be analyzed carefully.

The strike teams could penetrate from Afghanistan or Tajikistan. The NWFP is full of Afghan refugees and the Northern Areas have Turks, Tajiks and Uzbeks. Finding these persons who are reliable and capable is going to be the tough part, but not impossible.

Another option is to exfiltrate these teams from Indian soil. Therefore, the strike teams could penetrate from northern Kashmir. The northern areas of Jammu & Kashmir bordering Gilgit and Baltistan, mainly Kargil is a Shia dominated region, this could also serve as a recruiting base. There are also traditional routes that could be used for exfiltration into POK.

Additionally, India can find local recruits from amongst the Turks and Tajiks in these regions who could act as couriers and informants. Similarly, in POK the Gujjars and Bakkarwals can be recruited for the same purpose. Seasonal migrants and sheepherders come from the Northern Areas, Chitral and Koistan areas. They can also be recruited. The aim of penetrating the strike teams is to get them to strike in the rear areas of Pakistan. The entire infiltration process of both teams, will take at least one year. Then it is a slow task of making inroads into Pak society.

So it is clear that mission objectives of both teams are different and require different infiltration and exfiltration routes. As suggested above, the first team cannot jump off from India; the second might, given the right circumstances. The sleepers and agent provocateurs are always in danger of exposure. Thus their exfiltration will depend on their own resources and on the overall command and control of the mission. If mission control did want to abandon the task, then alternative exfilitration routes will require to be planned. The strike teams consisting of individuals, usually two to four must have routes of escape, and this is possible in those areas bordering India. It is thought best, diplomatically, at some stage to use Tajikistan as the exfilitration route for those employed in the Northern Areas and surrounding regions. Those in Baluchistan, Sind and NWFP will have to use Afghanistan or get to the Arabian Sea for exfiltration.

The first team should consist of 10-20 persons, both men and women who will be sent to Islamabad, Karachi, Rawalpindi and Lahore. The second team, consisting of only men will go to towns in Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP, as also the areas of Gilgit and Chitral. Numbers will depend on how much rear area attack is envisaged, perhaps initial numbers may be 8-10 in groups of two, to each region. The entire operation has to be planned keeping in mind that the initial period of infiltration and consolidation should be about four-six months. And then once the strike teams have got into place, situations can be created.

 

The aim of the first team is to settle in Pakistan, infiltrate society, make inroads and build networks for information gathering and find niches in high places. The agent provocateurs will be expendable and need to be locally recruited, though for the sake of authenticity, one or two sleepers need to be expendable also. Key areas of penetration are the bureaucracy, the army, ISI, elite middle class and media. After a lull of a year, information should be leaked, through available means of the existence of these agent provocateurs, who will have in their possession, propaganda material, disinformation material and generally stories that lull Pakistani intelligence into a sense of complacency that they have achieved a coup. Further, as the Russians so successfully did with the CIA and MI-6, the agent provocateurs should talk of moles and other sleepers in the Pak military and intelligence establishment to create internal dissension.

Once this leads to internal turmoil, it is time to activate the strike teams who will launch rear area attacks on installations of economic and military value. This will lead to further conspiracy theories being floated, leading to political uncertainty. The risk that this entails is that it will weaken the democratic process and possibly lead to military rule in Pakistan, but that is a contingency that India has to prepare for. The aim of strikes is to create a situation where the establishment is caught in an over-reach situation. The rear areas, which are under the administrative control of Pakistan, but given its tribal and ethnic composition are quite independent, can be suitably engaged by India for its own purposes. Strikes will mean deploying more police and para-military troops to these regions and will stretch the Pak establishment.

Surprise and timing are an important element in these missions and those in the strike formations should be constantly on the move, working from small towns, crowded market places and religious places. Rear area operations are to succeed by strikes in a few important cities and installations of economic value such as oil fields and tankers. Karachi city and its port is an example. Period of operations will depend on the nature of Pakistani response; if they do according to plan then teams can be exfiltrated. If they need to be in for some more time, then further deception plans need to be put into operation.

 

The duration of operations in most cases is stretchable. The first phase may take anything between one and three years, while the second phase will be carried out in synchronized fashion for a month or two in one place and then move on to another target. After a respite of a few months it will be time to carry out operations again. The long-term objective is to build information networks in Pakistan that will provide a human intelligence source for India and additionally it will help us make inroads into the military establishment and bureaucracy.  Along with the strike missions carried out by the second team, plans may be made to carry out heliborne operations and SF strikes in the border regions against militant training camps and other suitable targets. Forces for this are already available in the form of the National Security Guards and Indian Army para-commandos. These can be configured and trained for operations in a near-war like situation or simultaneously with the covert strike missions outlined above. All this of course requires a national security policy that seeks to engage and contain Pakistan in foreign policy terms.

To aid this process and to improve intelligence gathering on Pakistan the above covert action plan is commended to the Indian decision-maker and political leadership. The Indian diplomatic and security response to Pakistan sponsored terrorism has often been to fight fires within after the incidents have taken place. Additionally, there is a dialogue track, which seeks to engage Pakistan in a meaningful bilateral exchange. But little thought is given to the possibility of engaging in covert operations on a scale suggested above and its usefulness as a tool of diplomacy. The intention as stated above is not to help the disintegration of Pakistan but to engage Pakistan in a battle in which the key players, the army, ISI and bureaucracy will get embroiled to an extent that it creates conditions for, first Pakistan's disengagement from the sub-continent and second, may help the process of bilateral dialogue.